Secular Sermons

2004-03-24T22:20:00.000-05:00

Single Digit Dissents

Party line votes are common. Unanimity is common. Crossing party lines is common enough. What interests me is the few, the odd, the dissenter to the non-binding resolution that does no good other than voice the lonely opinion that they're against whatever it is everyone else is for.

On January 21, 2004, the U.S. House of Representatives passed Res. 492, honoring the contributions of Catholic schools.

The vote was 398-1. The lone dissenter was Representative Maurice Hinchey (D-NY 22nd), a 6 term Democrat from Saugerties (pronounced closer to "Socrates" than "Sugar-ties.") He is Catholic.

I have no idea why he, alone, opposed honoring the contributions of Catholic schools, whatever they may be (I'm sure the specific contributions were left vague, in order to garner near-unanimity). Perhaps he felt voting for the bill opened a slippery slope toward school vouchers, which he opposes. Perhaps
he felt that it violated the separation of church and state to honor a religious institution.

As a matter of fact, after the vote Hinchey told his colleagues that he had voted in error, and had meant to vote for the resolution. Likely story, Representative Hinchey.

So, our first look into single digit dissenters shows a cop-out. Oh well.

Next time, Democrats who wouldn't acknowledge Ronald Reagan was 93 years old, and Republicans who wouldn't recognize that Franklin Roosevelt ever did anything good.

2004-03-23T11:02:00.000-05:00

Abortion as an Alternative to Murder?

I read a bizarre little paper that was uploaded to SSRN yesterday entitled "Abortion and Infant Homicide" by David Kalist and Noellle Molinari. On the one hand, the premise is logically correct -- that permitting abortion, and further Medicaid funding of abortion for the poor -- decreases the rate of infant homicide, since woman who are willing to kill an unwanted baby will likely have an abortion first. The paper also had interesting information on infant homicide -- for example male babies are killed more often than female babies (2505 versus 2201 between 1976 and 1999), although it is unclear whether this is due to mothers not wanting male children, or the fact that male children are weaker and therefore less likely to survive an attempted infant homicide.

What was odd about the paper is that it was intended as a follow up on John Donohue and Seven Levitt's 2001 paper "The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime," which attempted to demonstrate a positive externality -- fetuses who are aborted are less likely to grow up and commit crimes.

This paper is written as if it were talking about the same type of externality, except that the entity that is either aborted or the victim of infant homicide is unusally the same person, a fact that sometimes seems lost of the authors.

Take this paragraph:

"In 1994, there were 203,200 Medicaid funded abortions at a total cost of $90 million, or about $443 per abortion. Assuming that the number of infant homicides is 20% lower in states that fund abortion, approximately 30 infant homicides were prevented in 1994. This implies that the cost per life saved is $3 million." (p. 15, emphasis added).

The 30 infant homicides were prevented by aborting the fetuses before they became babies. Now, those of us who are pro-choice see a clear moral and legal distinction between aborting a fetus and killing a baby. However, no one would think that aborting a baby to prevent an infant homicide would constitute "saving a life"!

The results are somewhat interesting, if not unexpected. However, the writers appear to believe they have found a positive externality, akin to Donohue and Levitt's. They have not.

2004-03-22T09:40:00.000-05:00

UVVA

The Unborn Victims of Violence Act is back in the news (listen to Fetal Laws on this morning's Morning Edition on NPR.)

Now, I consider myself strongly pro-Choice, and I think the law is a great idea and that NARAL is completely off base. I understand the general concern -- that allowing two crimes to be charged when a pregnant woman is harmed creates a data point of a fetus being treated as a "person". (The law itself defines "person" to include an unborn baby.) Women's groups propose an alternative of harsher penalties when the woman is pregnant, but that is not comparable, since a fetus could be killed without (other) serious harm befalling the mother.

The pro-Choice position, however, can be better put forward by supporting the woman's Choice no matter what it is. That means supporting abortion rights when they so chose, and supporting childbearing when they so chose. The unwanted killing of a fetus is as much a diminution of a woman's choice as is prohibition of abortion. There is room to reasonably legislate to promote Choice on both sides, to the betterment of women's welfare.

2004-02-17T10:36:00.000-05:00

Walruses, Dragons, and Ceiling Wax

As a child, I had two exposures only to the concept of "Sealing Wax".

1. The Walrus and the Carpenter

"The time has come," the Walrus said,
"To talk of many things:
Of shoes and ships and sealing-wax
Of cabbages and kings."

2. Puff the Magic Dragon

"Little Jackie Paper loved that rascal Puff
And brought him strings and sealing wax and other fancy stuff."

Now, as a young child raised in a world of self-adhesive envelopes, I had no idea what they were talking about, and assumed that "Ceiling Wax" was the way that you were able to paint the ceiling without all the paint sliding off.

I was embarrassingly old before I retroactively realized what the song and poem were talking about.

My question, though, is when exactly was the last time Americans regularly used Sealing Wax?

2004-02-17T09:55:00.000-05:00

Whitewashing Infanticide

It was a throwaway line on this morning's Morning Edition, that I have returned to listening to now that the Pledge Drive is over (Yes, I'm a member. Maybe they should give Member-Chips out with your membership that you can stick on your radio so you don't have to hear the Pledge Drive drivel. Also, didn't the Pledge Drive used to be called "Pledge Week"? Now it's about 10 days. . . )

Anyway, the story was about sex trafficking in Asia, and I was only half listening because, you know, I had to merge and stuff. But the line struck me, sort of the way you always hear your name in a crowd, even if you weren't listening to the conversation. Chinese men had been importing foreign brides "because of China's one child policy."

Well, China's one-child policy certainly decreases the number of available brides, but without anything else, woudn't one assume that it would cut down the number of available groom by almost exactly the same amount, so it would even out and all the heterosexuals could pair up in wedded bliss?

Well, no. Because China's one-child policy led to widespread female infanticide and gender selecting abortions as parents aided fate along toward getting a male heir.

Essentially, the Chinese man can't find a wife because his parents killed his older sister, causing the man who would have married the sister to instead marry another woman, leaving that woman unavailable for our "only child."

Blaming the One-Child Policy might be right from an Original Cause perspective, but it elides over the mass murder taking place in China.

2004-02-16T17:08:00.000-05:00

Fun With Anagrams
Compassionate Conservative = Conspire to Save a Vast Income.

President John F. Kerry = Short, Jerky Penfriend (or Frothed, Jerky Spinner)

Doctor Howard Dean = Too Drown'd Charade.

Federal Marriage Amendment = Render Amalgamated Firemen

Mars Spririt Rover = Prim Sorts Arrive

Alex Rodriguez, Yankee = Analogize, Exude Kerry

Mel Gibson's Passion = Pleasing Sin's Bosom

2004-02-12T08:19:00.000-05:00

100 Years of Bloomsday

Or so the headlines tell us. The book was actually written in 1917. It was SET on June 16, 1904, so Joyce essentially got the first 13 years of the Centenary for free.

Remind me when I write my novel to set in 98 years in the past. That way, after it goes off the best seller list, it can go right back on for its "Centenary."

2004-01-25T20:59:00.000-05:00

2004-01-20T13:39:00.000-05:00

As A Long-Time John Edwards Supporter . . .

I am very very happy today. :-)

2004-01-19T09:41:00.000-05:00

The Immorality of Pro Bono Work

One of the common criticisms about John Edwards, my personal choice for the Democratic nominee for President, is that he did not do any pro bono work. Here is a representative example from the New York Times

He represented many sympathetic plaintiffs, among them some horribly crippled children. He became rich doing it, racking up more than $175 million for his clients from 1985 to 1997 and amassing a personal fortune of at least $38 million, according to North Carolina Lawyers Weekly.

At the same time, he did little or no pro bono work. Nor did he pursue public-interest lawsuits. While he speaks passionately about civil rights and the bravery of civil rights leaders, for instance, he has never used his legal skills to fight against discrimination through the courts.

Law is not like journalism, so perhaps it is not unusual that journalists do not understand that the economics are different.

If a journalist takes a day off to work in a soup kitchen, he merely racks up a vacation day, and there is no other financial effect.

If a lawyer takes a day off to help the poor, he can not bill any hours worked that day. Assume a top lawyer can bill his time out at $400 per hour. Assume that he works an 8 hour day. That lawyer, spending a day doing pro bono work, has an opportunity cost of $3,200 ($400 times 8 hours). That lawyer will earn $3,200 less if he does a day or pro bono work. But the benefits to the poor will be no better than if a public-interest lawyer (making, say, $50K per year) does the work. He probably won't do even as well as the public interest lawyer, since he is outside of his area of expertise.

Now, let us assume that instead of doing a day of pro bono work, the lawyer bills eight hours, earns $3,200, and gives it all to the local legal aid group. That $3,200 will pay the salary of a public interest lawyer for over three weeks!

So, the question is, how can the wealthy best aid the poor? The answer is rarely to actually assist the poor themselves. The best thing for the wealthy to do is to make a lot of money, and give it to the public interest groups.

If I'm the poor, do I want one day of John Edwards, or three weeks of a public interest lawyer? The answer is obvious.

For those who are paid a salary, there is little concern for what is lost when time is spent for charitable purposes. For those who bill by the hour, there is a need to weigh opportunity costs. That is why charitable giving is a better proxy for charitable intent than billable hours foregone. In fact, in such circumstances, doing pro bono work to ease your own conscience, when the poor can be better served with a cash contribution, may in fact be the more immoral course of conduct.

2004-01-16T11:00:00.000-05:00

Press Release I'm Waiting to See

Howard Dean Endorses Every Candidate Except Himself

In an effort to stave off efforts by rivals to set themselves up as the anti-Dean, former Vermont governor Howard Dean has taken the unusual step of endorsing every candidate except himself.

"John Kerry, Wesley Clark, the all try to set themselves up as the anti-Dean," Dean said at his press conference. "Well, let's see how much traction they get after the press learns that not only are they not the anti-Dean, but they have in fact been endorsed by Howard Dean himself!"

A confident Dean continued, "Of course, I want all the Dean supporters to continue to give me their support. But more than that, I want all those Democratic voters who are looking for an alternative to Dean to see that there is only one candidate in the field today who has not been personally endorsed by Howard Dean, and that's me. Howard Dean."

2004-01-15T14:52:00.000-05:00

But He'll Get Frostbite Without Them Today

Today's entry in the Old Farmer's Alamanac reads, "The cat in gloves catches no mice."

I have no idea what that's supposed to mean.

2004-01-14T16:09:00.000-05:00

Lies and the Lying Liers . . .

I was thinking about lying the other day. Specifically, lying is one of the parade examples of the problem with Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative.

"Don't lie" is a rule we would like to be universally applicable. Therefore, it is absolutely prohibited, under Kant.

But what about when the Gestapo knocks on our door and asks if we have any Jews in hiding? Kant is very clear here (although, of course, he doesn't mention the Gestapo). We may not lie to the Nazis. We must always tell the truth, and the morally correct thing to do is to say, "Why yes, there is a family of Jews living in my attic."

To most, this is enough to knock the categorical imperative down from its high horse right there. There is no absolute to the opponents, only weighing of various moral constraints. Lying is bad, except when not lying is worse. Maybe this is right, but it's not Kant.

Others, though, defend the theory while trying to wrest this example out of its grasp. "It's not really a lie," they say, "if you mean something else."

You may say, "There are no Jews here," but what you really mean are, "There are no Jews here who I am willing to turn over to you." Therefore, no lie. This is permitted under some interpretations of the Jesuitic traditions. The Catholics call this "Mental Reservation." Some versions of the Talmudic tradition takes a similar approach.

The problem is, it doesn't pass the smell test. You may make a mental reservation, but that's not going to stop a perjury conviction. Also, it doesn't seem to have any boundaries. There's no distinction between lying about good things and lying about bad things.

There is another way, though, that I believe can save Kant from this example. It does not involve shrinking the definition of lying to exclude certain false statements like, "There are no Jews here." It expands the definition of lies to include certain types of promises -- explicit or implied.

When the Jews ask to hide in my attic and I grant permission, have I not implicitly promised, "I will not turn you over to the Gestapo"? I certainly have. If I promise not to turn you over to the Gestapo, and then do turn yo over, have I not lied in so promising? I believe that lie is just as much a falsehood as any that could be concurrently falsified.

So, when the Gestapo asks for an answer, the question is not, "Should I lie or not?" The question is "What lie should I tell?" There is simply no way not to lie here. You either put the lie to your earlier promise, or you lie to the Nazis.

By expanding the definition of "lie," we can save Kant, at least in this example. If it is a logical impossibility to tell the truth, we can look to some moral consideration other than truth-telling. Specifically, we can look at "life-preserving." Here, there is no conflict, so we know which lie it is we are allowed to tell.

2004-01-12T09:22:00.000-05:00

Back on the Plough, Men

Today is Plough Monday. Historically, it was the day that men went back to work after the winter holiday. Women went back to work the preceding Thursday (Distaff Day). I'm not sure why the men got the extra days off.

Women liked Plough Monday, because the men would often get into trouble when only the women had to go to work.

2004-01-11T09:44:00.000-05:00

2004 Endorsements

With the Iowa caucuses a week away, Secular Sermons endorses all candidates in the following order:

1. Edwards
2. Clark
3. Lieberman
4. Kerry
5. Dean
6. Gephart
7. Mosely-Braun
8. Bush
9. Kucinich
10. Sharpton

2004-01-07T13:24:00.000-05:00

Reflections on Plato's Euthyphro, Part III

The facts of Euthyphro's case at Court that day are as much a polemic as Socrates' definition against any given definition of Piety. Specifically, the case that Euthyphro is prosecuting provides 3 distinct axes of moral ambiguity that, taken together, neither indicate that Euthyphro is acting impiously, nor clearly validate him. Consider:

Euthyphro is prosecuting his father for throwing a dependent who killed one of his slaves in a pit and allowing him to die.

Axis 1, Active v. Passive: Euthyphro's father does not kill the victim, but allows him to die of exposure when he is bound and thrown into a ditch while awaiting official orders as to what to do with him. Was this method of incapaciation common? Was the messenger gone an unusually long time getting official guidance? Was the weather unusually extreme? What is the moral distinction here between killing and "letting die"? Does the father's intent matter here?

Axis 2, Nature of Victim: Assuming what was done qualifies as a "murder", does the status of the victim here matter? The victim was himself a murderer. Seemingly, it was a reasonable to incapacitate him. This took place far from town, maybe this was the only safe way to incapacitate. Is it relevant whether the death penalty would have been a likely punishment for the victim anyway? Is it less bad to kill a murderer? On the other hand, in a class conscious society, would it be less bad that the victim "only" killed a slave?

Axis 3: Nature of the Defendant: Finally, assuming that this is "murder", and the victim's status as a killer doesn't mitigate, is it appropriate for Euthyphro, the defendant's son, to be the one to press charges? Perhaps it is pious to do what is pious no matter who is doing it. Or, perhaps, "filial piety" exists, giving a child a special duty to his father that a stranger wouldn't have. Perhaps Euthyphro should say, "It is pious to prosecute my father, but impious for me to do it."

None of the above is attempting to demonstrate that Euthyphro, in fact, acted impiously, merely that this case appears to have been brilliantly constructed specifically to evade our moral intuitions. We simply do not know whether he is acting correctly or not. We may come to our own moral conclusions on the issue, but it is easy to see a parallel moral system that would come to the opposite result without being necessarily being a "bad" result.

What this dialogue teaches us -- in a way that a mere essay cannot -- is taht irrespective of our eventual rule to define "piety", the only way to test it is against our intuitions, since a definition that leads to bad results must be faulty. But, in some cases, our intuitions, fail us. What is at first blush bad ("murder"), may be mitigated by the nature of the act (active? malicious?), the nature of the acted upon (himself a criminal), or even the nature of the actor himself (Euthyphro's father). Some of the mitigation may be enough to sway our conclusions about the crime itself.

And if the rules of moral action do not have the force of our intuitions -- if there is no external validation -- then is morality itself just an empty concept?

2004-01-06T08:00:00.000-05:00

Reflections of Plato's Euthyphro, Part II

Euthyphro's first suggested definition of Piety is to "Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to say, prosecuting anyone who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or any similar crime, whether he be your mother or your father or whoever he may be."

The response to this definition is obvious: Euthyphro has not defined piety; he has merely given an example of it. Socrates is seeking a general rule, and says so.
But the unspoken criticism here of Pietists like Euthyphro is that, for them, piety really is often is defined empirically -- through some sort of reverse induction. Rather than saying, "I do what I do because it is pious," the more common pseudo-analysis is, "I know what Pious is by looking at what I do." And without Socrates there to point it out, many are happy to leave it there.

It is the belief in our own inherent goodness (and who, other than Shakespearean villains like Iago or members of the "Legion of Doom" don't actively believe that they are "good") that Socrates initially calls into question. And Euthyphro's first definition (or, more precisely, the fact that it comes first) shows how dangerous it is. Analysis through self-observation is inherently circular: Do what good people do. We can see why it is wrong in Euthyphro, but many of our own moral judgments are based on just as flimsy a framework. I enjoy it and do it, so how could it be wrong?

Socrates likely believes that Piety is a term without any meaningful content at all. Or, rather, it is meaningful only to the extent that others believe that it has meaning. Socrates may be the first to suggest the counterintuitive theory that belief follows action, not (as we would all like to claim) that our actions follow from our beliefs. Either may allow internal consistency between action and belief, but the first is a pretty hollow consistency. It may be necessary to prevent cognitive dissonance, but it doesnâ€™t lead to moral action.

On the other hand, unless one believes oneself to be a saint, any definition of Piety (or morality) will necessarily cast the speaker as immoral. If we are all impious (and we can all agree to that in the abstract, at least), then any preaching about piety is always hypocritical. Think of Bill Bennett and his gambling problem. Bennett likely thinks himself a moral person, and apparently he has never actively preached the evils of gambling. He may not personally view gambling as immoral, or may place it on a lower level of morality. But, when his gambling was exposed we (who do see moral failings in big gamblers) quickly called him a hypocrite. Yes, OF COURSE he was a hypocrite, but I could have told you that before I heard about his gambling or any other alleged sin.

Name your moral crusader. Billy Graham? Joe Lieberman? Either sinless saints or hypocrites, every one of them. And since no one's a sinless saint (although the current Pope is piling up tons of alleged exceptions), they are all hypocrites. And, what's more, except for some general "We are all sinners" pablum, none of them will actually believe that they are hypocrites until the rare occasion that one or the other is forced by random circumstance to look their hypocrisy square in the face.

So, for the moral crusader, it may necessarily be infinitely more important to look at the message than the messenger. If the message is sound, recognize that the messenger is a hypocrite and move on before the Breaking News headline confirms what we already know. If the message is unsound, perhaps enjoy the moment of the schadenfreude during the fall from grace, but recognize that he, like Euthyphro and the rest of us (and likely even Socrates), probably really believed that he is a good person on a just quest.

2004-01-05T15:21:00.000-05:00

Reflections on Plato’s Euthyphro, Part I

I have recently been re-reading Euthyphro, an early Platonic dialogue about the nature of Piety. It doesn’t get discussed too much, I think, primarily because it is “unfinished” -- not in the sense that it trails off into silence, but in the sense that we never get to an adequate definition of what Piety actually is. Instead, we get each seven different suggested definition -- all shot down by Socrates -- until finally Euthyphro looks at his watch, claims he has a plane to catch, and scurries off into Court to try to put his father in jail.

Another reason it is often ignored is that it is often offered in the “Trial of Socrates” collections as Chapter One, where Socrates is waiting to find out about his trial, but it really has nothing to do with his own predicament except for the background that he is talking to Euthyphro while awaiting his turn in Court. We then hurry off to get to the heart of the Trial.

The fact that Socrates never offers his own definition leaves the student of Philosophy a little bit at a loss. Should we conclude that Piety has no meaning? Should we try to continue the dialogue and come up with the "right" definition that eluded Euthyphro? Does that even matter today when Philosophy and Religion are considered largely separate pursuits? If I am an atheist or an agnostic, should I even care?

In my view, the best way to read Euthyphro is from a modern perspective. And I will examine it from the perspective of both law and psychology. The questions that the dialogue ask are often more relevant today than they were to Socrates/Plato, but not necessarily to Philosophers (of which I am NOT one, aside from a college minor in the distant past. A little knowledge is a dangerous thing . . .).

I will not be “teaching” or “studying” Euthyphro as much as using it as a springboard for other reflections. The important point will not be what the “real” meaning of Piety is (damnedifIknow), but what the right way to go about thinking about it is, and how are choice to think one way or the other reflects more on us than it does on Piety (or secularly: ethics, morality, law) itself.

2003-12-30T16:49:00.000-05:00

Non-Secular News of the Day

Queer Savior for the Straight Religion?

I admit to not being an expert on religion, but wouldn't it be just as blasphemous to talk about Jesus as being heterosexual?

2003-12-29T08:55:00.000-05:00

Richard Posner's Wedding Bell Blues, a book review of Evan Gerstmann's book on Same-Sex Marriage is well worth reading, although I personally disagree with much of it. But the article itself is not what I want to right about (I have said enough about same-sex marriage recently). What interested me, rather, was the following paragraph, that touches on the issue of how and whether "Strength of Opinion" should be considered in a democracy.

The supporters of marriage, after all, are mainly heterosexuals--of the 40 percent of the population that according to the recent poll endorse homosexual marriage, the vast majority must be heterosexuals, since as I say homosexuals appear to be at most 3 percent of the population; and the only basis of their support, for most of them--an exception may be family members of homosexuals--is that homosexual marriage does not bother them. They do not feel passionate about the issue; it does not affect them. But many of the opponents are passionate in their opposition because they feel deeply threatened by the proposed change in the concept of marriage. And in a democratic society, powerful currents of public opinion deserve recognition even by the Supreme Court, at least in cases to which neither the Constitution nor any other authoritative legal text speaks with clarity.

The question is not obvious, as it sets the notions of basic democracy against utilitarian principles. If 10 people are vaguely against it, but don't care much one way or the other, and 3 people are strongly in favor, should the strength of opinion matter? Opponents of utilitarianism raise the spectre of the "Utility Monster", who loves hurting people SO MUCH that his increase in utility outweighs the harm to others. We do not need to go there, however, to come up with realistic, rational elements that a democratic utilitarian needs to address.

Most people are vaguely against steel tariffs because it increases the cost of steel by a few cents per steel item purchased. Workers in the steel industry are strongly in favor, since imports may cost them their jobs.

Most vaguely support cutting funding for the National Endowment for the Arts, but a few artists and art lovers strongly oppose it.

What should a democratic utilitarian do? Is it undemocratic to take the strength of sentiment into account?

First of all, the fact that the country is a Republic rather than a pure Democracy is a great way to stealthily include a Strength factor. Assuming that candidates for office have random views on issues*, the fact that I have to choose a candidate with some shared views over another candidate with other shared views forces me to look at my preferences, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

My father-in-law was Conservative in most of his viewpoints, but was very active in his Union. He thought Ronald Reagan was one of America's greatest presidents, but never voted for him. He alway voted straight Democrat because of his strong Union loyalties. My Great-Aunt is very liberal, but strongly pro-life. She believes abortion is murder and would never vote for a pro-choice candidate. As a result, she votes for many Republicans, many of whose views she does not share.

There are many One Issue Voters, for whom their views on abortion, guns, tax policy, gay rights, or whatever cause them to vote for the candidate who supports their issue of primary concern over a larger number of issues that are of secondary concern. There are many other Short List voters, who weigh views on a short number of issues more heavily, and will vote for one candidate even if, quantitatively, they will support the opposing candidate more often.

The end result, then, is that often the candidates elected will have views on "secondary" issues that are not shared by a majority of the electorate. People who oppose affirmative action vote for the Democrat because he is pro-Union. People who oppose tax cuts for the rich vote for the Republican because he is pro-gun. And maybe this for the best. Allowing representatives to vote on our behalf forces us to rank our preferences in a way that "pure" democracy simply can't.

But, then, we get opinion polls. And, sometimes, opinion polls turn into referenda. A single-issue referendum also has a "How much do I care" element. That is, do I care enough to vote? Over that threshold, however, there is no distinction between people who care a lot (e.g., single issue voters) and those who hardly care at all (e.g., those who support the issue, but always vote for candidates who oppose it because they agree with them on more important issues.) But why should I value your opinion on the issue if you don't even care enough about it to vote for representatives who agree with you?

In my view, "Utilitarian Democracy" (one vote for "utile") plays well in normal times. I am generally opposed to referenda primarily because they force you to Care, even if you may not, or even if its not worth it to you to find out which side you agree with.

When it comes to Constitutional Amendments, however, I would side with the double-check Democratic theory. You need a solid majority both numerically, and in terms of strength of feeling. The super-majority requirements are a good way to prevent a vocal minority from forcing through Constitutional amendments the same say they can normal legislation. (I am concerned, though, that a vocal half or so could force through the Federal Marriage Amendment.)

______________________________________________________________
*Of course, views are not random. They generally fall into the Democratic and Republican party platforms, with individual variation only around the edges. From the perspective of a moderate, or a libertarian, or some other person who has viewpoints that are firmly entrenched but don't match any party's platform of policies exactly, the variation from one's own viewpoint of the Good will seem, essentially, random.

2003-12-25T21:46:00.000-05:00

TWoO, Take Three

As it is December 25, the few left working and blogging are the devoutly secular and the Jews (as well as Buddhist, Shinto, and Hindus, based solely upon the selection of restaurants that are available for carry out tonight.)

So, it was no surprise that the one reply I received appears to have originated in Israel. My correspondent wrote:

I don't know if you have ever studied any literary theory, but the basic requirement for any story is that the protoganist go through some
transformative experience. For Dorothy, in order to be able to truly 'see' her back yard, first she had to run away and help others 'see' what they already had (scarecrow - brains, tinman - heart).

It reminds me of a allegoric tale I heard from Hebrew University
Professor Avi Ravitzky:

Shmuel, a devout Jew, has a dream three nights running of a treasure
buried under a bridge he knew that was three days travel from his home.
The dream was so vivid, that Shmuel decides to go and see if the
treasure is indeed buried there. After three days of travel, he arrives at the bridge and meets Joe, a Gentile. They start talking, and Joe asks Shmuel what he is doing there. Shmuel tells Joe about his dream. Joe says "that's strange, I have been having a weird dream as well" and goes on to describe a house with a treasure buried under the hearth.

Shmuel recognizes his own home from Joe's description, says farewell
and rushes home to find the treasure, which is indeed exactly where Joe
described it.

A simplistic take on this tale is "don't go looking for 'treasure' by
others, look in your own home first", i.e. a cultural isolationism.
But a closer look shows that the message is "you have treasure in your
own home, but you will only be able to see it through the eyes of the
Other".

While illuminating, I'm not sure it gets us all the way there. Or, at least, if this correctly describes why Dorothy learned what she did, is this the right lesson?

My response follows:

Interesting perspective. The only problem with it is, if Dorothy hadn't gone any further than her own backyard, the scarecrow would still be on his pole, and the tinman would still be rusted!

Just as in your midrash, the answer was back at home, but it may not have been possible to get there without first going on the quest. I.e., the fact that the quest was circular does not mean it was unnecessary.

So, Dorothy's lesson is not to only look in your own backyard next time. It is that it may be necessary to go all the way to Oz again, no matter how close the answer may be.

2003-12-24T10:49:00.000-05:00

MORAL FAULT, PUNISHMENT, AND ENVIRONMENT

I am personally opposed to the death penalty, but I believe that there is a moral obligation to pick your battles wisely and morally. Therefore, you will not hear me arguing loudly that the government debases itself even when it kills a person as hideous as John Muhammad.

What I am here to talk about is personal responsibility and degrees of guilt. Some argue that those who have been subject to mental controls -- like Lee Malvo, Muhammad's young accomplice -- are not morally responsible for their actions. I wrote the following on a comment thread of Crooked Timber regarding how much moral blame to attribute to Arabs who live under a dictatorship:

In the old days, upon seeing a convict led to the gallows, it was common to state, “There, but for the grace of God, go I.”

That was not just a cliche, but a belief that anyone, given difficult conditions, would become a criminal.

This “moral luck”, however, was never seen to remove the blame from the perpetrators. It is in no way inconsistent to say I am moral, you are immoral, but if we had been switched at birth I would be immoral, too.

Look at the boy in Virginia who was convicted for the sniper killings. Does anyone doubt that he was “made bad” by his accomplice? No. Neither is there any doubt (among the jurors, at least), that the boy, having been made bad, should be punished for his badness.

Context may be important for mitigation, but not for overall moral direction. A person speaking out against Inter-racial Marriage will seem like a big Racist today, but only as a mainstream racist, suitable for public office, 40 years ago. The same goes for opponents of gay rights today compared to those same opponents 40 years from now.

I have no problems morally condemning opponents of gay rights today, even as I understand that their opposition stems from being steeped in American society.

Similarly, we can recognize that Arabs are human and subject to moral condemnation when, for example, they cheer the deaths of innocent Americans, while understanding that, but for the grace of God, I’d be cheering right along side of them. Their conditions may potentially mitigate their warped worldview, but never eliminate it.

Subsequent to this post, Malvo, who had already been convicted of murder, was sentenced to life imprisonment rather than death. This seems entirely reasonable to me, putting aside my opposition to the death penalty. We morally condemn, and then adjust the punishment accordingly. Special conditions should always apply to the sentencing portion, not to the overall guilt or innocence of a person knowingly taken certain actions.

2003-12-23T08:58:00.000-05:00

An Even Bigger Conundrum from The Wizard of Oz

Okay, so maybe I'm being dense here. At the end of the movie, the Wizard floats off without her, but Dorothy is about to be rescued by Glinda, who asks her what she has learned. The lesson, and I might be paraphrasing here, is, "When I lose something, I know not to look any further than my own backyard, because if it isn't there, I never really lost it to begin with."

Glinda nods. The scarecrow says, "But that's so easy, I should have thought of it for you!" The tin woodsman says, "I should have felt it in my heart!"

"She wouldn't have believe it," Glinda says, "She had to figure it out for herself."

I, on the other hand, was left thinking, "How the heck was that the lesson of the movie?" I mean, she runs away, gets bonked on the head, and gets carried away in a cyclone. The "Don't Run Away" lesson was pretty quickly learned once she woke up and saw a chicken coop float by her window. Shouldn't the lesson have something to do with "friendship" or "cooperation" or even "good will defeat evil"? How the heck is the lesson of the 2 hour movie, "Just stay at home"?

Is the whole movie just a giant shaggy dog joke?

2003-12-22T09:46:00.000-05:00

Scholarships for Scholars? Not at Sarah Lawrence.

Bizarre article in the New York Times today about Washington University in St. Louis, which for the first time cracked the U.S. News Top Ten Universities.

How did they do it? Well, they raised their endowment with an aggressive fundraising campaign, and they improved the academic quality of their student body by providing scholarships.

Seems sensible to me. How could one possibly improve a school? Improve the teachers (which is very subjective), improve the facilities (which takes money), or improve the students. Now, improving the students could mean one of two things: either improving their academic qualities, or by diversifying (meaning whatever you want that to mean.)

Where I went to college, we promoted "diversity" by constantly referring to the fact that we had students from "All 50 states and over 100 countries." And, in fact, I did know people from all over.

One way to promote diversity, of course, is to increase the numbers of financially needy people. And the best way to do that is to give "need-based" financial aid. Almost all schools, both individually and through federal and state programs, give financial aid. Among top schools, however, very few give scholarships. That, of course, is their right. But I found odd this quotation.

Washington University is hardly the only highly ranked university to give merit aid to top students who may not need help to pay for school — Vanderbilt, Rice and Emory all devote a greater share of their financial aid budgets to the same end — but the issue has become a volatile one among elite institutions.

Many of them scorn merit aid as a not-so-subtle means of buying a better class, sometimes at the expense of lower-income students who need financial assistance.

"It's very frightening," said Heather McDonnell, director of financial aid at Sarah Lawrence College, referring to those few top institutions, like Wash U., that spend at least 15 percent of their financial aid budgets on merit aid. "If we were at a meeting together, I'd be growling at them."

It is "frightening", according to Heather McDonnell, that a school chooses to give at least 15% of their financial aid to the best students? Helping the poor is very important, and helping the poor get a quality education is even more important. But how can "only" giving 85% of your financial aid based on need possibly be frightening?

Meanwhile, Sarah Lawrence's annual cost (tuition plus room and board) is almost $5000 higher than Washington University's. That means that the poor will be more likely to be able to afford Washington University without needing financial aid.

The appropriate mix of need-based and merit-based financial aid should be a private decision of each University. I find it improper for one University to criticize the reasonable decisions of others.

2003-12-22T09:07:00.000-05:00

Scientific Accuracy in Movie Death Exclamations

Okay, so maybe this is just me. I'm watching The Wizard of Oz. The Scarecrow catches fire, and Dorothy throws a strategically placed bucket of water to douse the flame, accidentally splashing the Wicked Witch full in the face. We all know what she says as she falls to the floor: "I'm Melting! I'm Melting!"

Well, I've heard her say that about a million times, but I just realized: She's not melting. She's dissolving. Melting involves the application of heat. Dissolving involves being doused in water.

I expect more from my movie classics.

2003-12-19T16:04:00.000-05:00

DEAD POOL

Nice to see that Amish Tech Support, while immoral, at least has a sense of humor. I will wipe the floor with the immoral participants who vote for those they want to see dead. My rules are as follows:

1. Do not vote for people I respect, so that the news of their passing will not be meant with anything but pure sadness. Therefore, such oldsters as Simon Wiesenthal and Rosa Parks were immediately dismissed.

2. Research. This is both the find old sick people, and to make sure I hadn't misjudged them. Julia Child seemed a safe pick, being overweight and elderly, but did you know that she fought in the French resistance in World War II? I hadn't either. Same with heavyweight champion Max Schmeling, a German held up by Hitler as the Aryan ideal, who secretly hid Jews during WWII. Certainly can't pick them.

3. Don't pick people you hate. It is immoral to wish anyone dead, even your enemy.

4. Stick to entertainers, sports figures, and business people in industries of which I have no particular moral viewpoint.

5. Do not pick young people. The young may be worth more points, but it is immoral to pick someone who has not lived a full live. All of my picks are over 80 years old.

Consider these rules like the rules of Socially Responsible investing. And I WILL win.

2003-12-19T15:07:00.000-05:00

GAY LOVE

Maybe I'm alone in this, but it seems obvious to me that those who oppose equal rights for homosexuals to marry today will be considered just as evil in 50 years as those who opposed integration 50 years ago. I consider them just as evil now, but I'm apparently not in an overwhelming majority on that point yet. Nonetheless, when Jennifer Roback Morse published this article in National Review, I am befuddled that editors or publishers or whomever could consider what she was doing "argument." This article, I can certainly confirm, is made up of words. And those words are strung together into grammatically correct sentences. What these individual sentences mean, let alone how they go together into a logical argument, is anyone's guess. Let's take a look.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has opined that "government creates marriage." Therefore, government can recreate marriage, if it so chooses, or if the Supreme Court orders the other branches of government to do so. But surely, even the Massachusetts high court would not be so bold as to claim that government invents sex. And the meaning of human sexuality is really at the heart of the conflict over the judicial attempt to recreate marriage in its own image.

Translation: Massachusetts believes that marriage is marriage. But marriage isn't really marriage. Marriage is sex. Therefore, when Massachusetts talks about marriage, they are really talking about sex. This is a problem because sex is not really marriage (ha ha!). And marriage can't look like the Supreme Court because the Supreme Court wears robes, and when you get married and have sex, you have to disrobe.

So, what is the meaning of human sexuality anyhow? Sexual activity has two natural, organic purposes: procreation and spousal unity. Babies are the most basic and natural consequences of sexual activity. "Spousal unity" means simply that sex builds attachments between husband and wife.

Now, what we have to understand here, is that by "meaning" and "purpose", Morse actually means "results". Babies and unity can result from having sex. This is true. Gay sex cannot result in babies, but they can result in unity. So, since 99% of the time, people don't get pregnant following sex, it would seem that gay sex could be at least as "purposeful" as married sex when the wife is already pregnant.

Spousal unity is the feature of human sexuality that makes it distinct from purely animal sexuality. As far as I know, humans are the only animals that copulate face to face. Shakespeare described the sexual act as "making the two-backed beast." Both the Hebrew and the Christian Bible describe the sexual act as uniting the spouses in the most literal sense: "the two become one flesh." Two people become, if only for a short while, one flesh.

Now, by "spousal unity", one might think that Morse is talking about spiritual harmony and growing closer together as people. In fact, as now is clear, she is in fact referring to "unity" in the sense that "the two people are physically in the same location." So, for example, if my spouse and I are jammed face to face on the #42 bus because it's rush hour and there are no seats, this would meet the "spousal unity" definition as used here. Sitting in a movie theatre holding hands would not, because that is only making the "beast with one double-wide back and two breast on the same side of the front."

Evolutionary psychology observes the survival value to spousal cooperation. Males and females who attach themselves to each other, have a better chance of seeing their offspring survive long enough to produce grandchildren. Science can now tell us how the hormones released during sex help to create emotional bonds between the partners.

Once again, while written in spiritual language, but while she refers to "cooperation" Morse is clearly using "attach" in the physical sense of "screwing in the missionary position". Alternate methods of sexual interaction will apparently lead to dead children. That is why animals that use other means of coitus are now all extinct.

Both of these organic purposes, procreation and spousal unity, have something in common: They build up the community of the family. Procreation literally builds the community by adding new members to the family. Spousal unity builds up the community of the family because it contributes to the stability of the marriage relationship.

Therefore, we have built a direct correlation between child-bearing and missionary-position sex. Since homosexuals can't do either, they are clearly not acting "organic"ly. Morse does not address the fact that numerous homosexuals (and heterosexuals) have adopted children and have a family community that is wholly unrelated to their sexual relationship. Her logic is of the form: A is one path to B; X did not take A; therefore X will never get to B. It is, obviously, logically incoherent.

But for many people in modern America, sex has little or nothing to do with building community of any kind. Sex is a purely private matter, in the narrowest sense of private. Sex is a recreational activity, and a consumer good. My consumption of this good, my enjoyment of this activity, is a completely private matter that should be viewed analogously with other goods and activities.

Now, this is where things go from merely wrong to completely weird. Apparently, some people improperly consider sex to be "fun" and "none of her damn business." Morse only has sex to have kids and bond with her husband, but some people have the nerve to have sex for other reasons. These people need not be homosexuals. They may, however, be prostitutes. What, one might now be wondering, those this have to do with gay marriage. Let us skip down to find out.

A significant subset of heterosexuals share with homosexuals a common view of the meaning of human sexuality. . . We are going to have trouble understanding marriage, much less defending it, until we reopen this question of what human sexuality is all about. Is human sexuality an engine of sociability that calls us out of our self-centeredness? Or is it one more arena for the exercise of our self-centeredness? And if it is the latter, are there any automatic correction mechanisms that check our excesses the way market competition directs our self-interest into socially responsible channels?

Here we have our answer. The problem with gay marriage is that it would be EXACTLY THE SAME AS HETEROSEXUAL MARRIAGE! But heterosexual marriage is bad! So we should BAN heterosexual marriage. Right? Well, no. We should re-define heterosexual marriage so that it means something that homosexuals can't do. Then, we'll have a reason to keep them from marrying.

But meanwhile, is this a moral argument or an economic argument Morse is making? Is she saying that within marriage, you can have sex however and whenever you want, but outside of marriage, you are limited by how much you can afford to pay the prostitute, and the prostitute will charge more for "socially irreponsible"? extras? The mind reels.

We are more likely to be satisfied with the outcome, if we work with our biology rather than against it.

One might think this is common sense advise: If it hurts, try something else. Apparently, however, this sentence has something to do with opposition to gay marriage. Or, rather, she seems to not have anything against gay marriage. Instead, as far as I can tell, she merely objects to the gays (individually and collectively) who might want to get married, and probably wouldn't be happy with them trying to get into a heterosexual marriage either, because they'd just screw that up, too.

We will be happier if we face reality on its own terms

Yet it is unclear who, other than the author, is actually unhappy here. And on whose terms are we mistakenly facing reality at present?

And finally, consider two sentences that manage the exquisite feat of being both individually false and mutually contradictory.

Sexual activity and childrearing take place inside the private spaces of the home, far outside the reach of the public-enforcement power of the state.

Written as an eternal truism, mere months after sodomy was finally legalized. And then:

The law of marriage is not the only social structure that creates the context for socially acceptable sexual behavior. But the law does play a key part.

So state power DOES reach to sexual activity. The law tells us what is acceptable, but we can't legalize gay marriage because it is unacceptable, but it would become acceptable if we legalized, but we can't . . .

One wishes that opponents of gay marriage would just fall back on what they really mean: Gay sex is gross and the Bible says No.

It may be a bad argument, but at least it's an argument that is internally coherent!

Anyway, the Editors promise that this article is Part One of Two. I can hardly wait.

2003-12-18T14:19:00.000-05:00

Racial Slurs and the Use/ Mention Distinction

Perhaps this isn't being taught in schools anymore.

If I say, "That was a funny joke", I was Used the word "joke."

If I say, "The word 'joke' has four letters," I have not Used the word 'joke', I have merely mentioned it.

Today, people are calling for the head of a "Philadelphia principal who used the N-word in an eighth-grade class last month". Except that she didn't "use" the N-Word, she simply "mentioned" it.

[Mary Rita] Sheldon said she was admonishing a group of students about teasing a classmate who is visually impaired. She compared the N-word to the taunt used against the boy - "one-eyed jack" - and stressed that neither word should be used.

Essentially, Sheldon said "Do not use the N-Word." But she said the N-Word. That is a "mention," not a "use."

Nonetheless:

SCHOOL REFORM Commissioner Sandra Dungee Glenn yesterday, appearing visibly upset, said the white Philadelphia principal who used the N-word in an eighth-grade class last month should be forced out of her school, the Overbrook Educational Center.
. . .
"People of African descent were enslaved, brutalized, murdered and disrespected in this country because we were considered, not human beings, but...niggers," she said. "Nigger is the most derogatory racial epithet to be used against African-Americans. It has no place in our society, and it definitely has no place in our schools."

Note that Glenn, in her tirade against Sheldon, also mentions the N-word. It is unclear why her mention does not warrant the same disciplinary action as Sheldon's mention. Meanwhile, the Philadelphia Daily News (and this blog) have quoted Glenn, which apparently makes us third- and fourth-removed guilty of the same offense.

Using a slur should certainly be cause for concern. Merely mentioning a slur, however, should never be. As a firm believer in free speech, I believe that Sheldon should not be disciplined at all (or ever morally condemned) for the substance of her comments.

2003-12-16T10:39:00.000-05:00

The Perils of Intra-Racial Dating

So, the other day, I was talking to a friend of mine. We'll call him "Chris."

Chris is a second generation Chinese America. He talks without "accent." He is six feet tall, which makes him average height for an American (and well above average for an Asian American). Chris is a college graduate with an advanced degree. He is considered attractive. His tastes are very mainstream American. He would, objectively, be considered a "catch."

And until recently, he had never dated an Asian-American female.

Chris has told me, at a time when he had was not dating Asian women, and I have no reason to doubt him, that in his experience Asian girls tend to prefer white guys. In fact, it is a fact that about half of all Asian American married women are in inter-racial marriages. For as long as we were friends, he was almost always dating some girl or other. That girl, however, was never Asian. Chris claimed he had no racial preferences in who he dated. The Asian girls he has asked out, it seems, uniformly rejected him.

Recently, however, Chris's luck has changed. Chris now tells me that the Asian American girls of the type who had previously rejected him are now actively pursuing him.

Why the change? Perhaps he's just meeting different types of girls now than he was before?

No, that's not it, Chris tells me. Often, after a date he will accompany the woman home, and will look through any nearby photo albums. The albums will often show the woman with previous boyfriends, all of whom are blond. For each of these girls, Chris has confirmed, he is uniformly their first Asian-American boyfriend.

The difference, it seems, is that now Chris is of an age and social position (i.e., out of school with a good job) where he is not just boyfriend material, but potential-husband material. And Asian girls who had never before dated Asian men are now looking for men who are not only attractive personally, but also who can be brought home to mom and dad. That is, someone who is Asian.

Now, as I said, Chris does not particularly associate much with Asian culture. He is a burgers-and-fries, beer-and-football, Fox-reality-show kind of guy. He is, however, proud to be of Chinese ancestry, and is uncomfortable with the fact that the Asian girls who are dating him are dating him not because he is an Asian-American, but because he is the least Asian-American Asian-American they could find.

In other words, Chris feels like these girls would prefer to be dating white guys, but that he's an acceptable second best since he looks Asian, but acts White. And that makes him uncomfortable.

It is an interesting question: Is Chris the victim of prejudice by women of his own race? It doesn't seem like racism, but is seems likesomething. I'm not sure there's a word yet for what Chris is experiencing, but I can empathize with his discomfort.

2003-12-15T09:48:00.000-05:00

On the one hand, everyone's views are very nuanced, and it is unlikely that anyone agrees with anyone else on every matter.

On the other hand, polls are fun.

Therefore, I took the "Ethical Philosophy Selector" Quiz at Select Smart (which has previously told me that my belief system most closely matches Presidential candidate John Edwards.)

According to the test, I am a pure Utilitarian, matching 100% with Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.

This makes sense, since I believe that the basis of my belief structure is Utilitarian. I do, however, take seriously the deontological critiques of utilitarianism, and while I think utilitarianism will answer about 3/4 of moral conflict, my personal views on "close" issues, or issues that involves extremely large gains that just bearly outweigh extremely large losses, are more often swayed by deontological concerns.

Just so the readers know where I'm coming from, and can count their utiles at the door before entering.

2003-12-12T10:03:00.000-05:00

Secular Government v. Governmentally Enforced Secularism

An article in today's New York Times reports from France:

A report delivered to President Jacques Chirac on Thursday called for a new law banning the wearing of "conspicuous" religious symbols in French public schools — large crosses for Christians, head scarves for Muslim girls, or skullcaps for Jewish boys.

The recommendation was the most striking in an official reassessment of how to preserve the principle of the separation of religion and state in France in light of such developments as the rise of a large Muslim population and a new wave of anti-Semitism.

A confirmed secularist (see the blog title), I cannot see how there can be anything LESS secular than banning the religious from practicing the requirements of their religion.

The commission said that a 1905 law codifying the separation of church and state was no longer adequate given the cultural and religious composition of present-day France. It said that organized groups were testing the secular state by demands on public services in the name of religion and pressuring Muslims to identify first with their faith and then with their French citizenship.

The question really, is why France needs a ranking of preferences. Do Americans think, "I am an American first and a Christian/Jew/Muslim/Hindu Second"? No. 99% of the time it never comes up. One is perfectly free to be an American AND a Jew equally. And why is that? It's because the American doesn't tell the Jew that he cannot wear his yamulke to school.

What this requirement would do, essentially, is to make the French choose. Are you French, or are you a member of your religion? We will not let you be both.

While Americans should never have to face this choice (except in rare circumstances), the theme is one that is currently being debated, primarily in the area of school vouchers. Should tax money be diverted to private schools in a school voucher program? I can see the reasons on both sides (although I believe they weigh a little more heavily on the pro-voucher side). If school vouchers are allowed, should they be permitted to both religious and secular private schools?

Here's where the "separation of church and state" people fall into the same trap the French commission did.

#1 Permitting money to flow only to religious schools (or making it easier for religious schools to meet the requirements for funding) is a violation of the separation of church and state, and violates the principal of secular government.

#2 Permitting money to flow to any private school -- religious or secular -- if the schools meet the conditions under the program, is religion-neutral.

#3 Permitting money to flow only to secular schools is anti-religious in the same way that the French commission's recommendation is.

Those who favor the separation of church and state seem to set up a dichotomy between #2 and #3, setting #2 as constitutionally prohibited. In fact, we should be looking at the law not as a Kantian but as an Aristotelian. The question is not Yes (#2) versus No (#3), but a question of finding the "golden mean" wherein religion is treating equally with secularism. Aristotle would be the first to tell you that #2 is the golden mean between the forcing of pro-religion (#1) and anti-religion (#3).

It is too often assumed that to be Secular, you must fight the Religious. That is not true. To be Secular, all you must do to the Religious is ignore it.

2003-12-11T10:58:00.000-05:00

Where's That Independent Variable When You Need It Most

Through Marginal Revolutions we learn from New Scientist that men lose the ability to think rationally when presented with pictures of beautiful women, but women do not lose the ability when presented with pictures of beautiful men.

That is exactly as I wound expect, but not because women are less distracted by sexuality than men are. Rather, I would expect that women would evoke a similar (if not as strong) response to the men's when presented with the same pictures of beautiful women.

If nothing else, it is clear to me that women have vastly different opinions of what constitutes an attractive man. Some go for the skinny hair-band-looking types, some go for the distinguished professional look. Very few go for Fabio. The lack of a consistent definition of "hotness" is enough to confound the study.

More importantly, though, women DO have consistent views about the "hotness" of women to a much greater extent than (heterosexual) men do about the hotness of men. And also, their views largely overlap with the views of men on the issue. (Although the overlap is not exact. See, e.g., Sarah Jessica Parker, who every woman I know thinks is gorgeous, but no man I know does.)

This scientific study, for example, provides evidence that heterosexual women have the same sexual response to "gay porn" that lesbians do. Men, however, have sexual responses that are "orientation specific."

If you are going to study this issue and come to any sort of reasonable conclusions, you have to at least show both groups the same pictures!

2003-12-11T09:34:00.000-05:00

The Duty to Act

“quid leges sine moribus vanae proficiunt?"

“what good are empty laws without good morals?”

--Horace’s Third Ode.

The opposite question is being debated at Crooked Timber, where there is general bemusement that in the American common law there is no affirmative requirement that a person save a stranger, even if he could do so with little or no effort. What good, the contrapositive Horaces ask, is a clear moral obligation without a legal framework to back it up? We all understand a moral obligation to save a drowning baby – so why won’t the law punish us for failing to do so?

In the case of Pope v. State of Maryland (1979), Joyce Pope invites in an acquaintance named Melissa and Melissa’s baby son to stay in her house because they have nowhere else to go. Melissa is clearly delusional, and alternates between being herself and thinking she is God. Pope witnesses Melissa, in her delusional state, perform an “exorcism” that involves great violence to the baby. She does nothing to either prevent the “exorcism” or to call for help. The three then go to church, where the Reverend discovers that the baby that Melissa is holding is dead and immediately calls ambulance.
Pope is convicted of child abuse, for not doing anything to prevent the harm to the baby in her house. The trial judge believes that she has taken responsibility for the baby by allowing them into her house. The Appeals Court reverses the conviction, however, saying:

“Pope’s conduct, during and after the acts of abuse, must be evaluated with regard for the rule that although she may have had a strong moral obligation to help the child, she was under no legal obligation to do so unless she then had responsibility for the supervision of the child as contemplated by the child abuse statute. She may not be punished as a felon under our system of justice for failing to fulfill a moral obligation, and the short of it is that she was under no legal obligation.”

The fact that she allowed them into her house, essentially “rescuing” them from the elements, did not place upon her the additional responsibility of protecting the baby from her mother once they were inside the house.

To the legally trained, this is the obvious result. To the rest, in may seem absurd. Why is it that in this particularity, the law fails to track morality? Or has Joyce Pope acted immorally at all?

The answer, as explained by judges and legal philosophers, has primarily to do with the fact that the law only punishes Actions. Inaction, absent the rare obligation to act, cannot be punished. In general, obligations are not imposed without are consent. So, we have obligations to our children, but not to the children of others.

While this is the response generally given, I do not think it is entirely correct. As a first pass, I think the rule can be tied intimately with what has been broadly seen as a right to privacy. As Justice Louis Brandeis once said, “"The makers of the Constitution conferred the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by all civilized men—the right to be let alone.” Justice William Douglas added, "The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom." When we require action, we are infringing on the basic American right to just not get involved.

Further, selfless action seems a lot less selfless when it is not compelled by law. The 99 out of 100 people who would save the drowning baby deserve recognition for doing what was right, not merely for complying with Cons. Stat. § 345.678(j)(2).

2003-12-10T14:40:00.000-05:00

Four data points in the news:

1. Penn and Yale Law Schools are challenging the Solomon Amendment, which requires law schools to permit on campus recruiting by the military in exchange for receiving federal financial funding.

2. International donors, whom Palestinians hope to convince to provide 60% of their budget ($1.2 billion), are frustrated by the failure to move toward peace.

3. The Boy Scouts have permitted the Philadelphia chapter to enact a “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy so that the city doesn’t take back the land they originally provided the Boy Scouts, as they threatened to do due to the Boy Scout’s non-gays policy. This also allows the Boy Scouts to get money from the United Way. [no link. Source, WHYY local news on Morning Edition]

4. Of course, the Supreme Court today permitted limitations on campaign contributions to candidates and political parties.

What do these four stories all have in common? They all involve using Other People’s Money to change how we act.

The Solomon Amendment and Boy Scout stories are actually the same issue from opposite sides. Governmental agency threatens to pull funding unless the group changes the way they “associate” with homosexuals.

The Palestinian issue is somewhat different, from the perspective of the donors: namely, at what point do you remove the incentive to change, as opposed to continuing to provide funding in hopes that the money will make a difference.

Finally, the campaign finance issue is different because we’re talking about private money, rather than government money, but is rooted in the same belief that funding will affect viewpoints. A candidate may vote for laws that large donors want, rather than the laws that his constituents want.

The over-arching question here is what to do when the financial recipients have different values than the financial donors. Is it different when it is the government “imposing” its viewpoints? I think it is. Both the Solomon Amendments and the Philadelphia Boy Scout resolution, while legal, are, I would argue, abuses of the government’s spending powers. When we allow the government to become the primary funder of a private organization, we permit it to control -- to some degree – the practices of the funded. It is simply not practical for Yale and Penn to give up government funds. Those funds are used for scholarships, and would put those schools at an extreme disadvantage to give up. There is a conformity imposed on recipients of the same funds that numbs those who value diversity.

With the Boy Scouts, the question should be, why is the government giving land in the first place? My philosophical problems with the United Way are an unrelated issue.

It is something to remember the next time you want the government to support your pet project – government funds always come with strings attached, and even if you like the present puppeteer, you might not like the next one.

2003-12-10T10:51:00.000-05:00

Test Post for Secular Sermons.