Secular Sermons

2004-03-24T22:20:00.000-05:00

Single Digit Dissents

Party line votes are common. Unanimity is common. Crossing party lines is common enough. What interests me is the few, the odd, the dissenter to the non-binding resolution that does no good other than voice the lonely opinion that they're against whatever it is everyone else is for.

On January 21, 2004, the U.S. House of Representatives passed Res. 492, honoring the contributions of Catholic schools.

The vote was 398-1. The lone dissenter was Representative Maurice Hinchey (D-NY 22nd), a 6 term Democrat from Saugerties (pronounced closer to "Socrates" than "Sugar-ties.") He is Catholic.

I have no idea why he, alone, opposed honoring the contributions of Catholic schools, whatever they may be (I'm sure the specific contributions were left vague, in order to garner near-unanimity). Perhaps he felt voting for the bill opened a slippery slope toward school vouchers, which he opposes. Perhaps
he felt that it violated the separation of church and state to honor a religious institution.

As a matter of fact, after the vote Hinchey told his colleagues that he had voted in error, and had meant to vote for the resolution. Likely story, Representative Hinchey.

So, our first look into single digit dissenters shows a cop-out. Oh well.

Next time, Democrats who wouldn't acknowledge Ronald Reagan was 93 years old, and Republicans who wouldn't recognize that Franklin Roosevelt ever did anything good.

2004-03-23T11:02:00.000-05:00

Abortion as an Alternative to Murder?

I read a bizarre little paper that was uploaded to SSRN yesterday entitled "Abortion and Infant Homicide" by David Kalist and Noellle Molinari. On the one hand, the premise is logically correct -- that permitting abortion, and further Medicaid funding of abortion for the poor -- decreases the rate of infant homicide, since woman who are willing to kill an unwanted baby will likely have an abortion first. The paper also had interesting information on infant homicide -- for example male babies are killed more often than female babies (2505 versus 2201 between 1976 and 1999), although it is unclear whether this is due to mothers not wanting male children, or the fact that male children are weaker and therefore less likely to survive an attempted infant homicide.

What was odd about the paper is that it was intended as a follow up on John Donohue and Seven Levitt's 2001 paper "The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime," which attempted to demonstrate a positive externality -- fetuses who are aborted are less likely to grow up and commit crimes.

This paper is written as if it were talking about the same type of externality, except that the entity that is either aborted or the victim of infant homicide is unusally the same person, a fact that sometimes seems lost of the authors.

Take this paragraph:

"In 1994, there were 203,200 Medicaid funded abortions at a total cost of $90 million, or about $443 per abortion. Assuming that the number of infant homicides is 20% lower in states that fund abortion, approximately 30 infant homicides were prevented in 1994. This implies that the cost per life saved is $3 million." (p. 15, emphasis added).

The 30 infant homicides were prevented by aborting the fetuses before they became babies. Now, those of us who are pro-choice see a clear moral and legal distinction between aborting a fetus and killing a baby. However, no one would think that aborting a baby to prevent an infant homicide would constitute "saving a life"!

The results are somewhat interesting, if not unexpected. However, the writers appear to believe they have found a positive externality, akin to Donohue and Levitt's. They have not.

2004-03-22T09:40:00.000-05:00

UVVA

The Unborn Victims of Violence Act is back in the news (listen to Fetal Laws on this morning's Morning Edition on NPR.)

Now, I consider myself strongly pro-Choice, and I think the law is a great idea and that NARAL is completely off base. I understand the general concern -- that allowing two crimes to be charged when a pregnant woman is harmed creates a data point of a fetus being treated as a "person". (The law itself defines "person" to include an unborn baby.) Women's groups propose an alternative of harsher penalties when the woman is pregnant, but that is not comparable, since a fetus could be killed without (other) serious harm befalling the mother.

The pro-Choice position, however, can be better put forward by supporting the woman's Choice no matter what it is. That means supporting abortion rights when they so chose, and supporting childbearing when they so chose. The unwanted killing of a fetus is as much a diminution of a woman's choice as is prohibition of abortion. There is room to reasonably legislate to promote Choice on both sides, to the betterment of women's welfare.

2004-02-17T10:36:00.000-05:00

Walruses, Dragons, and Ceiling Wax

As a child, I had two exposures only to the concept of "Sealing Wax".

1. The Walrus and the Carpenter

"The time has come," the Walrus said,
"To talk of many things:
Of shoes and ships and sealing-wax
Of cabbages and kings."

2. Puff the Magic Dragon

"Little Jackie Paper loved that rascal Puff
And brought him strings and sealing wax and other fancy stuff."

Now, as a young child raised in a world of self-adhesive envelopes, I had no idea what they were talking about, and assumed that "Ceiling Wax" was the way that you were able to paint the ceiling without all the paint sliding off.

I was embarrassingly old before I retroactively realized what the song and poem were talking about.

My question, though, is when exactly was the last time Americans regularly used Sealing Wax?

2004-02-17T09:55:00.000-05:00

Whitewashing Infanticide

It was a throwaway line on this morning's Morning Edition, that I have returned to listening to now that the Pledge Drive is over (Yes, I'm a member. Maybe they should give Member-Chips out with your membership that you can stick on your radio so you don't have to hear the Pledge Drive drivel. Also, didn't the Pledge Drive used to be called "Pledge Week"? Now it's about 10 days. . . )

Anyway, the story was about sex trafficking in Asia, and I was only half listening because, you know, I had to merge and stuff. But the line struck me, sort of the way you always hear your name in a crowd, even if you weren't listening to the conversation. Chinese men had been importing foreign brides "because of China's one child policy."

Well, China's one-child policy certainly decreases the number of available brides, but without anything else, woudn't one assume that it would cut down the number of available groom by almost exactly the same amount, so it would even out and all the heterosexuals could pair up in wedded bliss?

Well, no. Because China's one-child policy led to widespread female infanticide and gender selecting abortions as parents aided fate along toward getting a male heir.

Essentially, the Chinese man can't find a wife because his parents killed his older sister, causing the man who would have married the sister to instead marry another woman, leaving that woman unavailable for our "only child."

Blaming the One-Child Policy might be right from an Original Cause perspective, but it elides over the mass murder taking place in China.

2004-02-16T17:08:00.000-05:00

Fun With Anagrams
Compassionate Conservative = Conspire to Save a Vast Income.

President John F. Kerry = Short, Jerky Penfriend (or Frothed, Jerky Spinner)

Doctor Howard Dean = Too Drown'd Charade.

Federal Marriage Amendment = Render Amalgamated Firemen

Mars Spririt Rover = Prim Sorts Arrive

Alex Rodriguez, Yankee = Analogize, Exude Kerry

Mel Gibson's Passion = Pleasing Sin's Bosom

2004-02-12T08:19:00.000-05:00

100 Years of Bloomsday

Or so the headlines tell us. The book was actually written in 1917. It was SET on June 16, 1904, so Joyce essentially got the first 13 years of the Centenary for free.

Remind me when I write my novel to set in 98 years in the past. That way, after it goes off the best seller list, it can go right back on for its "Centenary."

2004-01-25T20:59:00.000-05:00

2004-01-20T13:39:00.000-05:00

As A Long-Time John Edwards Supporter . . .

I am very very happy today. :-)

2004-01-19T09:41:00.000-05:00

The Immorality of Pro Bono Work

One of the common criticisms about John Edwards, my personal choice for the Democratic nominee for President, is that he did not do any pro bono work. Here is a representative example from the New York Times

He represented many sympathetic plaintiffs, among them some horribly crippled children. He became rich doing it, racking up more than $175 million for his clients from 1985 to 1997 and amassing a personal fortune of at least $38 million, according to North Carolina Lawyers Weekly.

At the same time, he did little or no pro bono work. Nor did he pursue public-interest lawsuits. While he speaks passionately about civil rights and the bravery of civil rights leaders, for instance, he has never used his legal skills to fight against discrimination through the courts.

Law is not like journalism, so perhaps it is not unusual that journalists do not understand that the economics are different.

If a journalist takes a day off to work in a soup kitchen, he merely racks up a vacation day, and there is no other financial effect.

If a lawyer takes a day off to help the poor, he can not bill any hours worked that day. Assume a top lawyer can bill his time out at $400 per hour. Assume that he works an 8 hour day. That lawyer, spending a day doing pro bono work, has an opportunity cost of $3,200 ($400 times 8 hours). That lawyer will earn $3,200 less if he does a day or pro bono work. But the benefits to the poor will be no better than if a public-interest lawyer (making, say, $50K per year) does the work. He probably won't do even as well as the public interest lawyer, since he is outside of his area of expertise.

Now, let us assume that instead of doing a day of pro bono work, the lawyer bills eight hours, earns $3,200, and gives it all to the local legal aid group. That $3,200 will pay the salary of a public interest lawyer for over three weeks!

So, the question is, how can the wealthy best aid the poor? The answer is rarely to actually assist the poor themselves. The best thing for the wealthy to do is to make a lot of money, and give it to the public interest groups.

If I'm the poor, do I want one day of John Edwards, or three weeks of a public interest lawyer? The answer is obvious.

For those who are paid a salary, there is little concern for what is lost when time is spent for charitable purposes. For those who bill by the hour, there is a need to weigh opportunity costs. That is why charitable giving is a better proxy for charitable intent than billable hours foregone. In fact, in such circumstances, doing pro bono work to ease your own conscience, when the poor can be better served with a cash contribution, may in fact be the more immoral course of conduct.

2004-01-16T11:00:00.000-05:00

Press Release I'm Waiting to See

Howard Dean Endorses Every Candidate Except Himself

In an effort to stave off efforts by rivals to set themselves up as the anti-Dean, former Vermont governor Howard Dean has taken the unusual step of endorsing every candidate except himself.

"John Kerry, Wesley Clark, the all try to set themselves up as the anti-Dean," Dean said at his press conference. "Well, let's see how much traction they get after the press learns that not only are they not the anti-Dean, but they have in fact been endorsed by Howard Dean himself!"

A confident Dean continued, "Of course, I want all the Dean supporters to continue to give me their support. But more than that, I want all those Democratic voters who are looking for an alternative to Dean to see that there is only one candidate in the field today who has not been personally endorsed by Howard Dean, and that's me. Howard Dean."

2004-01-15T14:52:00.000-05:00

But He'll Get Frostbite Without Them Today

Today's entry in the Old Farmer's Alamanac reads, "The cat in gloves catches no mice."

I have no idea what that's supposed to mean.

2004-01-14T16:09:00.000-05:00

Lies and the Lying Liers . . .

I was thinking about lying the other day. Specifically, lying is one of the parade examples of the problem with Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative.

"Don't lie" is a rule we would like to be universally applicable. Therefore, it is absolutely prohibited, under Kant.

But what about when the Gestapo knocks on our door and asks if we have any Jews in hiding? Kant is very clear here (although, of course, he doesn't mention the Gestapo). We may not lie to the Nazis. We must always tell the truth, and the morally correct thing to do is to say, "Why yes, there is a family of Jews living in my attic."

To most, this is enough to knock the categorical imperative down from its high horse right there. There is no absolute to the opponents, only weighing of various moral constraints. Lying is bad, except when not lying is worse. Maybe this is right, but it's not Kant.

Others, though, defend the theory while trying to wrest this example out of its grasp. "It's not really a lie," they say, "if you mean something else."

You may say, "There are no Jews here," but what you really mean are, "There are no Jews here who I am willing to turn over to you." Therefore, no lie. This is permitted under some interpretations of the Jesuitic traditions. The Catholics call this "Mental Reservation." Some versions of the Talmudic tradition takes a similar approach.

The problem is, it doesn't pass the smell test. You may make a mental reservation, but that's not going to stop a perjury conviction. Also, it doesn't seem to have any boundaries. There's no distinction between lying about good things and lying about bad things.

There is another way, though, that I believe can save Kant from this example. It does not involve shrinking the definition of lying to exclude certain false statements like, "There are no Jews here." It expands the definition of lies to include certain types of promises -- explicit or implied.

When the Jews ask to hide in my attic and I grant permission, have I not implicitly promised, "I will not turn you over to the Gestapo"? I certainly have. If I promise not to turn you over to the Gestapo, and then do turn yo over, have I not lied in so promising? I believe that lie is just as much a falsehood as any that could be concurrently falsified.

So, when the Gestapo asks for an answer, the question is not, "Should I lie or not?" The question is "What lie should I tell?" There is simply no way not to lie here. You either put the lie to your earlier promise, or you lie to the Nazis.

By expanding the definition of "lie," we can save Kant, at least in this example. If it is a logical impossibility to tell the truth, we can look to some moral consideration other than truth-telling. Specifically, we can look at "life-preserving." Here, there is no conflict, so we know which lie it is we are allowed to tell.

2004-01-12T09:22:00.000-05:00

Back on the Plough, Men

Today is Plough Monday. Historically, it was the day that men went back to work after the winter holiday. Women went back to work the preceding Thursday (Distaff Day). I'm not sure why the men got the extra days off.

Women liked Plough Monday, because the men would often get into trouble when only the women had to go to work.

2004-01-11T09:44:00.000-05:00

2004 Endorsements

With the Iowa caucuses a week away, Secular Sermons endorses all candidates in the following order:

1. Edwards
2. Clark
3. Lieberman
4. Kerry
5. Dean
6. Gephart
7. Mosely-Braun
8. Bush
9. Kucinich
10. Sharpton

2004-01-07T13:24:00.000-05:00

Reflections on Plato's Euthyphro, Part III

The facts of Euthyphro's case at Court that day are as much a polemic as Socrates' definition against any given definition of Piety. Specifically, the case that Euthyphro is prosecuting provides 3 distinct axes of moral ambiguity that, taken together, neither indicate that Euthyphro is acting impiously, nor clearly validate him. Consider:

Euthyphro is prosecuting his father for throwing a dependent who killed one of his slaves in a pit and allowing him to die.

Axis 1, Active v. Passive: Euthyphro's father does not kill the victim, but allows him to die of exposure when he is bound and thrown into a ditch while awaiting official orders as to what to do with him. Was this method of incapaciation common? Was the messenger gone an unusually long time getting official guidance? Was the weather unusually extreme? What is the moral distinction here between killing and "letting die"? Does the father's intent matter here?

Axis 2, Nature of Victim: Assuming what was done qualifies as a "murder", does the status of the victim here matter? The victim was himself a murderer. Seemingly, it was a reasonable to incapacitate him. This took place far from town, maybe this was the only safe way to incapacitate. Is it relevant whether the death penalty would have been a likely punishment for the victim anyway? Is it less bad to kill a murderer? On the other hand, in a class conscious society, would it be less bad that the victim "only" killed a slave?

Axis 3: Nature of the Defendant: Finally, assuming that this is "murder", and the victim's status as a killer doesn't mitigate, is it appropriate for Euthyphro, the defendant's son, to be the one to press charges? Perhaps it is pious to do what is pious no matter who is doing it. Or, perhaps, "filial piety" exists, giving a child a special duty to his father that a stranger wouldn't have. Perhaps Euthyphro should say, "It is pious to prosecute my father, but impious for me to do it."

None of the above is attempting to demonstrate that Euthyphro, in fact, acted impiously, merely that this case appears to have been brilliantly constructed specifically to evade our moral intuitions. We simply do not know whether he is acting correctly or not. We may come to our own moral conclusions on the issue, but it is easy to see a parallel moral system that would come to the opposite result without being necessarily being a "bad" result.

What this dialogue teaches us -- in a way that a mere essay cannot -- is taht irrespective of our eventual rule to define "piety", the only way to test it is against our intuitions, since a definition that leads to bad results must be faulty. But, in some cases, our intuitions, fail us. What is at first blush bad ("murder"), may be mitigated by the nature of the act (active? malicious?), the nature of the acted upon (himself a criminal), or even the nature of the actor himself (Euthyphro's father). Some of the mitigation may be enough to sway our conclusions about the crime itself.

And if the rules of moral action do not have the force of our intuitions -- if there is no external validation -- then is morality itself just an empty concept?

2004-01-06T08:00:00.000-05:00

Reflections of Plato's Euthyphro, Part II

Euthyphro's first suggested definition of Piety is to "Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to say, prosecuting anyone who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or any similar crime, whether he be your mother or your father or whoever he may be."

The response to this definition is obvious: Euthyphro has not defined piety; he has merely given an example of it. Socrates is seeking a general rule, and says so.
But the unspoken criticism here of Pietists like Euthyphro is that, for them, piety really is often is defined empirically -- through some sort of reverse induction. Rather than saying, "I do what I do because it is pious," the more common pseudo-analysis is, "I know what Pious is by looking at what I do." And without Socrates there to point it out, many are happy to leave it there.

It is the belief in our own inherent goodness (and who, other than Shakespearean villains like Iago or members of the "Legion of Doom" don't actively believe that they are "good") that Socrates initially calls into question. And Euthyphro's first definition (or, more precisely, the fact that it comes first) shows how dangerous it is. Analysis through self-observation is inherently circular: Do what good people do. We can see why it is wrong in Euthyphro, but many of our own moral judgments are based on just as flimsy a framework. I enjoy it and do it, so how could it be wrong?

Socrates likely believes that Piety is a term without any meaningful content at all. Or, rather, it is meaningful only to the extent that others believe that it has meaning. Socrates may be the first to suggest the counterintuitive theory that belief follows action, not (as we would all like to claim) that our actions follow from our beliefs. Either may allow internal consistency between action and belief, but the first is a pretty hollow consistency. It may be necessary to prevent cognitive dissonance, but it doesnâ€™t lead to moral action.

On the other hand, unless one believes oneself to be a saint, any definition of Piety (or morality) will necessarily cast the speaker as immoral. If we are all impious (and we can all agree to that in the abstract, at least), then any preaching about piety is always hypocritical. Think of Bill Bennett and his gambling problem. Bennett likely thinks himself a moral person, and apparently he has never actively preached the evils of gambling. He may not personally view gambling as immoral, or may place it on a lower level of morality. But, when his gambling was exposed we (who do see moral failings in big gamblers) quickly called him a hypocrite. Yes, OF COURSE he was a hypocrite, but I could have told you that before I heard about his gambling or any other alleged sin.

Name your moral crusader. Billy Graham? Joe Lieberman? Either sinless saints or hypocrites, every one of them. And since no one's a sinless saint (although the current Pope is piling up tons of alleged exceptions), they are all hypocrites. And, what's more, except for some general "We are all sinners" pablum, none of them will actually believe that they are hypocrites until the rare occasion that one or the other is forced by random circumstance to look their hypocrisy square in the face.

So, for the moral crusader, it may necessarily be infinitely more important to look at the message than the messenger. If the message is sound, recognize that the messenger is a hypocrite and move on before the Breaking News headline confirms what we already know. If the message is unsound, perhaps enjoy the moment of the schadenfreude during the fall from grace, but recognize that he, like Euthyphro and the rest of us (and likely even Socrates), probably really believed that he is a good person on a just quest.

2004-01-05T15:21:00.000-05:00

Reflections on Plato’s Euthyphro, Part I

I have recently been re-reading Euthyphro, an early Platonic dialogue about the nature of Piety. It doesn’t get discussed too much, I think, primarily because it is “unfinished” -- not in the sense that it trails off into silence, but in the sense that we never get to an adequate definition of what Piety actually is. Instead, we get each seven different suggested definition -- all shot down by Socrates -- until finally Euthyphro looks at his watch, claims he has a plane to catch, and scurries off into Court to try to put his father in jail.

Another reason it is often ignored is that it is often offered in the “Trial of Socrates” collections as Chapter One, where Socrates is waiting to find out about his trial, but it really has nothing to do with his own predicament except for the background that he is talking to Euthyphro while awaiting his turn in Court. We then hurry off to get to the heart of the Trial.

The fact that Socrates never offers his own definition leaves the student of Philosophy a little bit at a loss. Should we conclude that Piety has no meaning? Should we try to continue the dialogue and come up with the "right" definition that eluded Euthyphro? Does that even matter today when Philosophy and Religion are considered largely separate pursuits? If I am an atheist or an agnostic, should I even care?

In my view, the best way to read Euthyphro is from a modern perspective. And I will examine it from the perspective of both law and psychology. The questions that the dialogue ask are often more relevant today than they were to Socrates/Plato, but not necessarily to Philosophers (of which I am NOT one, aside from a college minor in the distant past. A little knowledge is a dangerous thing . . .).

I will not be “teaching” or “studying” Euthyphro as much as using it as a springboard for other reflections. The important point will not be what the “real” meaning of Piety is (damnedifIknow), but what the right way to go about thinking about it is, and how are choice to think one way or the other reflects more on us than it does on Piety (or secularly: ethics, morality, law) itself.

2003-12-30T16:49:00.000-05:00

Non-Secular News of the Day

Queer Savior for the Straight Religion?

I admit to not being an expert on religion, but wouldn't it be just as blasphemous to talk about Jesus as being heterosexual?

2003-12-29T08:55:00.000-05:00

Richard Posner's Wedding Bell Blues, a book review of Evan Gerstmann's book on Same-Sex Marriage is well worth reading, although I personally disagree with much of it. But the article itself is not what I want to right about (I have said enough about same-sex marriage recently). What interested me, rather, was the following paragraph, that touches on the issue of how and whether "Strength of Opinion" should be considered in a democracy.

The supporters of marriage, after all, are mainly heterosexuals--of the 40 percent of the population that according to the recent poll endorse homosexual marriage, the vast majority must be heterosexuals, since as I say homosexuals appear to be at most 3 percent of the population; and the only basis of their support, for most of them--an exception may be family members of homosexuals--is that homosexual marriage does not bother them. They do not feel passionate about the issue; it does not affect them. But many of the opponents are passionate in their opposition because they feel deeply threatened by the proposed change in the concept of marriage. And in a democratic society, powerful currents of public opinion deserve recognition even by the Supreme Court, at least in cases to which neither the Constitution nor any other authoritative legal text speaks with clarity.

The question is not obvious, as it sets the notions of basic democracy against utilitarian principles. If 10 people are vaguely against it, but don't care much one way or the other, and 3 people are strongly in favor, should the strength of opinion matter? Opponents of utilitarianism raise the spectre of the "Utility Monster", who loves hurting people SO MUCH that his increase in utility outweighs the harm to others. We do not need to go there, however, to come up with realistic, rational elements that a democratic utilitarian needs to address.

Most people are vaguely against steel tariffs because it increases the cost of steel by a few cents per steel item purchased. Workers in the steel industry are strongly in favor, since imports may cost them their jobs.

Most vaguely support cutting funding for the National Endowment for the Arts, but a few artists and art lovers strongly oppose it.

What should a democratic utilitarian do? Is it undemocratic to take the strength of sentiment into account?

First of all, the fact that the country is a Republic rather than a pure Democracy is a great way to stealthily include a Strength factor. Assuming that candidates for office have random views on issues*, the fact that I have to choose a candidate with some shared views over another candidate with other shared views forces me to look at my preferences, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

My father-in-law was Conservative in most of his viewpoints, but was very active in his Union. He thought Ronald Reagan was one of America's greatest presidents, but never voted for him. He alway voted straight Democrat because of his strong Union loyalties. My Great-Aunt is very liberal, but strongly pro-life. She believes abortion is murder and would never vote for a pro-choice candidate. As a result, she votes for many Republicans, many of whose views she does not share.

There are many One Issue Voters, for whom their views on abortion, guns, tax policy, gay rights, or whatever cause them to vote for the candidate who supports their issue of primary concern over a larger number of issues that are of secondary concern. There are many other Short List voters, who weigh views on a short number of issues more heavily, and will vote for one candidate even if, quantitatively, they will support the opposing candidate more often.

The end result, then, is that often the candidates elected will have views on "secondary" issues that are not shared by a majority of the electorate. People who oppose affirmative action vote for the Democrat because he is pro-Union. People who oppose tax cuts for the rich vote for the Republican because he is pro-gun. And maybe this for the best. Allowing representatives to vote on our behalf forces us to rank our preferences in a way that "pure" democracy simply can't.

But, then, we get opinion polls. And, sometimes, opinion polls turn into referenda. A single-issue referendum also has a "How much do I care" element. That is, do I care enough to vote? Over that threshold, however, there is no distinction between people who care a lot (e.g., single issue voters) and those who hardly care at all (e.g., those who support the issue, but always vote for candidates who oppose it because they agree with them on more important issues.) But why should I value your opinion on the issue if you don't even care enough about it to vote for representatives who agree with you?

In my view, "Utilitarian Democracy" (one vote for "utile") plays well in normal times. I am generally opposed to referenda primarily because they force you to Care, even if you may not, or even if its not worth it to you to find out which side you agree with.

When it comes to Constitutional Amendments, however, I would side with the double-check Democratic theory. You need a solid majority both numerically, and in terms of strength of feeling. The super-majority requirements are a good way to prevent a vocal minority from forcing through Constitutional amendments the same say they can normal legislation. (I am concerned, though, that a vocal half or so could force through the Federal Marriage Amendment.)

______________________________________________________________
*Of course, views are not random. They generally fall into the Democratic and Republican party platforms, with individual variation only around the edges. From the perspective of a moderate, or a libertarian, or some other person who has viewpoints that are firmly entrenched but don't match any party's platform of policies exactly, the variation from one's own viewpoint of the Good will seem, essentially, random.

2003-12-25T21:46:00.000-05:00

TWoO, Take Three

As it is December 25, the few left working and blogging are the devoutly secular and the Jews (as well as Buddhist, Shinto, and Hindus, based solely upon the selection of restaurants that are available for carry out tonight.)

So, it was no surprise that the one reply I received appears to have originated in Israel. My correspondent wrote:

I don't know if you have ever studied any literary theory, but the basic requirement for any story is that the protoganist go through some
transformative experience. For Dorothy, in order to be able to truly 'see' her back yard, first she had to run away and help others 'see' what they already had (scarecrow - brains, tinman - heart).

It reminds me of a allegoric tale I heard from Hebrew University
Professor Avi Ravitzky:

Shmuel, a devout Jew, has a dream three nights running of a treasure
buried under a bridge he knew that was three days travel from his home.
The dream was so vivid, that Shmuel decides to go and see if the
treasure is indeed buried there. After three days of travel, he arrives at the bridge and meets Joe, a Gentile. They start talking, and Joe asks Shmuel what he is doing there. Shmuel tells Joe about his dream. Joe says "that's strange, I have been having a weird dream as well" and goes on to describe a house with a treasure buried under the hearth.

Shmuel recognizes his own home from Joe's description, says farewell
and rushes home to find the treasure, which is indeed exactly where Joe
described it.

A simplistic take on this tale is "don't go looking for 'treasure' by
others, look in your own home first", i.e. a cultural isolationism.
But a closer look shows that the message is "you have treasure in your
own home, but you will only be able to see it through the eyes of the
Other".

While illuminating, I'm not sure it gets us all the way there. Or, at least, if this correctly describes why Dorothy learned what she did, is this the right lesson?

My response follows:

Interesting perspective. The only problem with it is, if Dorothy hadn't gone any further than her own backyard, the scarecrow would still be on his pole, and the tinman would still be rusted!

Just as in your midrash, the answer was back at home, but it may not have been possible to get there without first going on the quest. I.e., the fact that the quest was circular does not mean it was unnecessary.

So, Dorothy's lesson is not to only look in your own backyard next time. It is that it may be necessary to go all the way to Oz again, no matter how close the answer may be.

2003-12-24T10:49:00.000-05:00

MORAL FAULT, PUNISHMENT, AND ENVIRONMENT

I am personally opposed to the death penalty, but I believe that there is a moral obligation to pick your battles wisely and morally. Therefore, you will not hear me arguing loudly that the government debases itself even when it kills a person as hideous as John Muhammad.

What I am here to talk about is personal responsibility and degrees of guilt. Some argue that those who have been subject to mental controls -- like Lee Malvo, Muhammad's young accomplice -- are not morally responsible for their actions. I wrote the following on a comment thread of Crooked Timber regarding how much moral blame to attribute to Arabs who live under a dictatorship:

In the old days, upon seeing a convict led to the gallows, it was common to state, “There, but for the grace of God, go I.”

That was not just a cliche, but a belief that anyone, given difficult conditions, would become a criminal.

This “moral luck”, however, was never seen to remove the blame from the perpetrators. It is in no way inconsistent to say I am moral, you are immoral, but if we had been switched at birth I would be immoral, too.

Look at the boy in Virginia who was convicted for the sniper killings. Does anyone doubt that he was “made bad” by his accomplice? No. Neither is there any doubt (among the jurors, at least), that the boy, having been made bad, should be punished for his badness.

Context may be important for mitigation, but not for overall moral direction. A person speaking out against Inter-racial Marriage will seem like a big Racist today, but only as a mainstream racist, suitable for public office, 40 years ago. The same goes for opponents of gay rights today compared to those same opponents 40 years from now.

I have no problems morally condemning opponents of gay rights today, even as I understand that their opposition stems from being steeped in American society.

Similarly, we can recognize that Arabs are human and subject to moral condemnation when, for example, they cheer the deaths of innocent Americans, while understanding that, but for the grace of God, I’d be cheering right along side of them. Their conditions may potentially mitigate their warped worldview, but never eliminate it.

Subsequent to this post, Malvo, who had already been convicted of murder, was sentenced to life imprisonment rather than death. This seems entirely reasonable to me, putting aside my opposition to the death penalty. We morally condemn, and then adjust the punishment accordingly. Special conditions should always apply to the sentencing portion, not to the overall guilt or innocence of a person knowingly taken certain actions.

2003-12-23T08:58:00.000-05:00

An Even Bigger Conundrum from The Wizard of Oz

Okay, so maybe I'm being dense here. At the end of the movie, the Wizard floats off without her, but Dorothy is about to be rescued by Glinda, who asks her what she has learned. The lesson, and I might be paraphrasing here, is, "When I lose something, I know not to look any further than my own backyard, because if it isn't there, I never really lost it to begin with."

Glinda nods. The scarecrow says, "But that's so easy, I should have thought of it for you!" The tin woodsman says, "I should have felt it in my heart!"

"She wouldn't have believe it," Glinda says, "She had to figure it out for herself."

I, on the other hand, was left thinking, "How the heck was that the lesson of the movie?" I mean, she runs away, gets bonked on the head, and gets carried away in a cyclone. The "Don't Run Away" lesson was pretty quickly learned once she woke up and saw a chicken coop float by her window. Shouldn't the lesson have something to do with "friendship" or "cooperation" or even "good will defeat evil"? How the heck is the lesson of the 2 hour movie, "Just stay at home"?

Is the whole movie just a giant shaggy dog joke?

2003-12-22T09:46:00.000-05:00

Scholarships for Scholars? Not at Sarah Lawrence.

Bizarre article in the New York Times today about Washington University in St. Louis, which for the first time cracked the U.S. News Top Ten Universities.

How did they do it? Well, they raised their endowment with an aggressive fundraising campaign, and they improved the academic quality of their student body by providing scholarships.

Seems sensible to me. How could one possibly improve a school? Improve the teachers (which is very subjective), improve the facilities (which takes money), or improve the students. Now, improving the students could mean one of two things: either improving their academic qualities, or by diversifying (meaning whatever you want that to mean.)

Where I went to college, we promoted "diversity" by constantly referring to the fact that we had students from "All 50 states and over 100 countries." And, in fact, I did know people from all over.

One way to promote diversity, of course, is to increase the numbers of financially needy people. And the best way to do that is to give "need-based" financial aid. Almost all schools, both individually and through federal and state programs, give financial aid. Among top schools, however, very few give scholarships. That, of course, is their right. But I found odd this quotation.

Washington University is hardly the only highly ranked university to give merit aid to top students who may not need help to pay for school — Vanderbilt, Rice and Emory all devote a greater share of their financial aid budgets to the same end — but the issue has become a volatile one among elite institutions.

Many of them scorn merit aid as a not-so-subtle means of buying a better class, sometimes at the expense of lower-income students who need financial assistance.

"It's very frightening," said Heather McDonnell, director of financial aid at Sarah Lawrence College, referring to those few top institutions, like Wash U., that spend at least 15 percent of their financial aid budgets on merit aid. "If we were at a meeting together, I'd be growling at them."

It is "frightening", according to Heather McDonnell, that a school chooses to give at least 15% of their financial aid to the best students? Helping the poor is very important, and helping the poor get a quality education is even more important. But how can "only" giving 85% of your financial aid based on need possibly be frightening?

Meanwhile, Sarah Lawrence's annual cost (tuition plus room and board) is almost $5000 higher than Washington University's. That means that the poor will be more likely to be able to afford Washington University without needing financial aid.

The appropriate mix of need-based and merit-based financial aid should be a private decision of each University. I find it improper for one University to criticize the reasonable decisions of others.

2003-12-22T09:07:00.000-05:00

Scientific Accuracy in Movie Death Exclamations

Okay, so maybe this is just me. I'm watching The Wizard of Oz. The Scarecrow catches fire, and Dorothy throws a strategically placed bucket of water to douse the flame, accidentally splashing the Wicked Witch full in the face. We all know what she says as she falls to the floor: "I'm Melting! I'm Melting!"

Well, I've heard her say that about a million times, but I just realized: She's not melting. She's dissolving. Melting involves the application of heat. Dissolving involves being doused in water.

I expect more from my movie classics.